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Gianmarco León-Ciliotta
Associate Professor, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, BSE, IPEG, CEPR & BREAD
Gianmarco León-Ciliotta is an associate professor at Universitat Pompeu Fabra, Barcelona School of Economics and IPEG, and a research affiliate at CEPR and BREAD. He got his BA at Pontificia Universidad Catolica del Perú and his PhD from UC Berkeley (ARE). His research interests are in development, political and organisational economics, studying voter and politicians’ behaviour; and the organisational design and personnel policy of public sector organisations.
Recent work by Gianmarco León-Ciliotta
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How effective are monetary incentives to vote?
A larger fine for electoral abstention increases voter turnout but does not affect election outcomes in settings with compulsory voting
Published 11.03.24
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Sharing financial incentives between community health workers and their supervisors improved healthcare in Sierra Leone
A shared performance incentive scheme for health workers and their supervisors improved productivity and health outcomes and was more effective than paying the incentive to only one group
Published 09.01.24
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Policymaking, trust, and the demand for public services
After the public disclosure of alleged forced sterilisations during a family planning campaign, municipalities in Peru with more victims exhibited a steep decline in public health services and lower levels of trust in public institutions
Published 24.10.23
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Promotion, pay and productivity: Evidence from Sierra Leone
Do meritocratic promotions increase worker productivity?
Published 25.01.23
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How teacher wage policies help reduce urban-rural achievement gaps: Evidence from Peru
Wage policies that account for teacher preferences can achieve a more effective and equitable geographic allocation of teachers
Published 04.10.21
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When transparency fails: Financial incentives for local banking agents in Indonesia
In contexts where information on new financial technologies is limited, publicly disclosing an agent’s financial incentives negatively impacts take-up
Published 04.06.21
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Is quality upgrading a motive for vertical integration?
Vertically integrating suppliers is a strategy firms use to improve product quality by ensuring higher-quality inputs
Published 06.03.20
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Accountability institutions, political capture and selection into politics
Recall referendums can keep politicians in check but backfire if poorly administered, causing quality potential candidates to stay out of politics
Published 05.04.19